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The principle of relativity is a principle that narrows the possibilities; it
is not a model, just as the second law of thermodynamics is not a model.
Albert Einstein1
Abstract
In a comparison of the principles of special relativity and of quantum
mechanics, the former theory is marked by its relative economy and
apparent explanatory simplicity. A number of theorists have thus been
led to search for a small number of postulates—essentially information
theoretic in nature—that would play the role in quantum mechanics
that the relativity principle and the light postulate jointly play in Ein-
stein’s 1905 special relativity theory. The purpose of the present paper
is to resist this idea, at least in so far as it is supposed to reveal the
fundamental form of the theory. It is argued that the methodology
of Einstein’s 1905 theory represents a victory of pragmatism over ex-
planatory depth; and that its adoption only made sense in the context
of the chaotic state state of physics at the start of the 20th century—as
Einstein well knew.
1This statement was made by Einstein in 1911 at a scientific meeting in Zurich; see
Galison (2004), p. 268. In 1911 Einstein was still using “principle of relativity” to mean
theory of relativity.
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1 Quantum mechanics: the CBH theorem
In an important recent development in quantum mechanics, Clifton, Bub
and Halvorson (henceforth CBH) have shown that the observables and state
space of a physical theory must be quantummechanical if three ‘information-
theoretic’ constraints hold.2 The constraints are:
1. no superluminal information transmission between two systems by
measurement on one of them,
2. no broadcasting of information contained in an unknown physical
state,3 and
3. no unconditionally secure bit-commitment.
The CBH theorem states that these constraints force any theory formulated
in C∗-algebraic terms to incorporate a non-commuting algebra of observables
for individual systems, kinematic independence for the algebras of space-
like separated systems and the possibility of entanglement between space-
like separated systems. (Conversely, any C∗-algebraic theory with these
distinctively quantum properties will satisfy at least the three information-
theoretic constraints.4)
This result is not only of great interest in itself, but it appeared at
a time when attention to the putatively fundamental role that the notion
of information plays in understanding quantum theory has been growing
significantly. It is not our aim in this paper to examine in detail either the
scope of the theorem5, or the contentious issue of the role of information in
modern physics6. We are concerned with the methodological issues at stake.
At the start of their paper, CBH wrote:
The fact that one can characterize quantum theory . . . in terms of
just a few simple information-theoretic principles . . . lends cre-
2Clifton et al. (2003).
3The notion of broadcasting, and the fact of its failure in quantum theory, is due to
Barnum et al. (1996). No-broadcasting is a more distinctively quantum feature than the
more familiar no-cloning theorem.
4CBH showed (op. cit) that such quantum properties imply the first two constraints,
and Halvorson (2004) showed that the third constraint related to bit-commitment also
follows.
5In this connection see Valentini (2003) and Timpson (2004), section 9.2.2. We feel it
worthwhile pointing out that in non-relativistic quantum mechanics, it has long been ac-
cepted that signalling at infinite speeds is a theoretical possibility. For example, a particle
strictly confined to a region of compact support by means of a potential barrier can propa-
gate to arbitrary distances in arbitrarily short times when the barrier is suddenly removed.
This does not violate the no-signalling theorem in quantum mechanics because the latter
is defined with respect to communication between pairs of entangled systems. But what
this case emphasizes is that the no-superluminal-information-transmission constraint in
the CBH theorem is of limited validity, at least in non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
6See Timpson (2002, 2003, 2004).
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dence to the idea that an information-theoretic point of view
is the right perspective to adopt in relation to quantum the-
ory. Notice, in particular, that our derivation links information-
theoretic principles directly to the very features of quantum
theory—noncommutativity and nonlocality—that are so con-
ceptually problematic from a purely physical/mechanical point
of view. We therefore suggest substituting for the conceptu-
ally problematic mechanical perspective on quantum theory an
information-theoretic perspective. That is, we are suggesting
that quantum theory be viewed, not as first and foremost a me-
chanical theory of waves and particles . . . but as a theory about
the possibilities and impossibilities of information transfer.7
Even more significantly for our purposes, at the end of their paper CBH
suggested an analogy between their characterization of quantum mechan-
ics and Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (henceforth SR). The
“foundational significance” of the CBH derivation is, according to these au-
thors, that quantum mechanics should be interpreted as a principle theory,
in the sense of the term that Einstein used to describe his 1905 formula-
tion of SR.8. CBH saw their constraints as analogous to the principles—the
relativity principle and the light postulate—used by Einstein to derive the
nature of relativistic kinematics.
There can be no doubt that Einstein’s 1905 treatment of relativistic kine-
matics was a triumph of economy in relation to the corresponding treatment
of moving rods and (to the extent it existed, as we see below) clocks provided
by the leading fin de sie`cle ether theorists. But it is still not sufficiently ap-
preciated that by his own admission, Einstein’s principle theory route was
based on a policy of despair, and represented a strategic retreat from the
more desirable but, in his view, temporarily unavailable constructive ap-
proach. It is worth dwelling a little on this historical episode, to see what
implications it might have for the CBH program.9
2 Special relativity as a “principle theory”
It is well known that the principle/constructive theory distinction was artic-
ulated by Einstein in a popular article on his theory of relativity published in
1919 in the London Times10. But it was a theme that appeared sporadically
throughout his life-long writings.
7Clifton et al. (2003), p. 4.
8Clifton et al. (2003), p. 24.
9The present paper, sections 2, 3 and 4 of which draw heavily on Brown (2005a, b), is
a development of views expressed in Timpson (2004), section 9.2.
10Einstein (1919).
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In January 1908, roughly two and a half years after publishing his cel-
ebrated paper on special relativity11, Einstein wrote in a letter to Arnold
Sommerfeld:
So, first to the question of whether I consider the relativistic
treatment of , e.g., the mechanics of electrons as definitive. No,
certainly not. It seems to me too that a physical theory can
be satisfactory only when it builds up its structures from ele-
mentary foundations. The theory of relativity is not more con-
clusively and absolutely satisfactory than, for example, classical
thermodynamics was before Boltzmann had interpreted entropy
as probability. If the Michelson-Morley experiment had not put
us in the worst predicament, no one would have perceived the
relativity theory as a (half) salvation.12
Einstein is repeating here an analogy between SR and thermodynamics that
he had mentioned in a published note addressed to Ehrenfest already in 1907,
in which he compared SR with “the second law of the theory of heat.”13 In
both cases, Einstein was emphasizing the limitations of SR, not its strengths.
In order to see why SR is only a ‘half’ salvation, consider for a minute
the analogy with thermodynamics.
Think of an idealized single-piston heat engine undergoing a Carnot cy-
cle, and consider the theoretical limits of its efficiency. Such limits can in
principle be established by exploiting knowledge of the micro-structure of
the working substance of the engine, and in particular by using the princi-
ples of statistical mechanics that apply to the molecular structure of the gas
in the piston. A much easier approach, however, is to fall back on the laws of
classical thermodynamics to shed light on the performance of the engine—
phenomenological laws which stipulate nothing about the deep structure of
the working substance. According to this approach, the efficiency of the heat
engine must depend in a certain way on the ratio of the temperatures of the
two heat reservoirs simply because, whatever the gas in the piston is made
up of, if it did not it would be possible for the engine to act as a perpetual
motion machine of ’the second kind’. And this possibility is simply ruled
out by hypothesis in thermodynamics.
Yet it is hard to not to wonder why, after all, such a perpetual motion
cannot exist. Indeed, it is widely held that statistical mechanics in principle
explains why (even if the details involved are controversial). But thermody-
namics cannot. The impossibility of perpetual motion machines of various
kinds is the very starting point of thermodynamics. What this theory gains
in practicality and in the evident empirical solidity of its premisses, it loses
in providing physical insight.
11Einstein (1905).
12Einstein (1995).
13Einstein (1907).
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Einstein considered thermodynamics as the archetypical example of what
he would call in 1919 a principle theory in physics, one which is based on
well verified, but unexplained observable regularities. On the other hand,
statistical mechanics, or more specifically the kinetic theory of gases, was
for Einstein the prime example of a constructive theory, one built on the
“elementary foundations” mentioned in his 1908 letter. These foundations
involve hypotheses about unseen fundamental processes—normally involving
the microstructure of bodies and its mechanical principles.
The distinction has been the subject of increasing attention in recent
years14, but it is easily misunderstood. First, it is clearly not categorical:
all theories have principles, it is just that some are more phenomenological
than others. Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics are on opposite
ends of a spectrum of possible theories, and there are indeed respectable
theories—as we shall see below—which lie somewhere in between.
Principle theories are typically employed when constructive theories are
either unavailable, too difficult to build, or relatively unwieldy. For accord-
ing to Einstein, “when we say we have succeeded in understanding a group
of natural processes, we invariably mean that a constructive theory has been
found which covers the processes in question.”15 Yet, Einstein stressed that
SR is a principle theory. Why then did he feel it necessary to sacrifice
explanatory content in developing his theory of relativity?
3 Rods, clocks, and the quantum
Recall the title of Einstein’s 1905 relativity paper: “On the electrodynamics
of moving bodies”. One of the great challenges of late nineteenth century
electrodynamics and optics was to predict the outcome of experiments in-
volving electromagnetic phenomena being performed in a laboratory moving
with respect to the luminiferous ether. After all, the earth is in motion rela-
tive to the centre of mass of the solar system, and at least some of the time
must be moving relative to the ether—the invisible seat of electromagnetic
phenomena. But by the turn of the century, the ether had become in the
minds of some experts a very shadowy entity indeed. Made of an obscure
kind of “imponderable matter”, its main role was increasingly just that of
providing the inertial frame of reference relative to which the fundamental
electromagnetic field equations of Maxwell were postulated to hold. The
question was now: what form do the field equations have in earth-bound
frames that are moving relative to this fundamental frame?
Einstein is famous for claiming in 1905, on the basis of his relativity prin-
ciple, that all laws of physics, including those of electrodynamics, take the
same form in all inertial reference frames, so happily Maxwell’s equations
14See, for example, Brown and Pooley (2001, 2006) and Balashov and Janssen (2003).
15Einstein (1919).
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can be used just as well in the moving laboratory frame. But this conclu-
sion, or something very close to it, had already been anticipated by several
great ether theorists, including H. A. Lorentz, Joseph Larmor and partic-
ularly Henri Poincare´. This was largely because there had been from the
middle of the nineteenth century all the way to 1905 a series of experiments
involving optical and electromagnetic effects that failed to show any sign of
the ether wind rushing through the laboratory: it was indeed as if the earth
was always at rest relative to the ether. (The most famous of these, and the
most surprising, was of course the 1887 Michelson-Morley experiment.) Like
the above-mentioned ether theorists, Einstein realized that the covariance
of Maxwell’s equations—the form invariance of the equations—is achieved
when the relevant coordinate transformations take a very special form, but
Einstein was unique in his understanding that these transformations, prop-
erly understood, encode new predictions as to the behaviour of rigid bodies
and clocks in motion. That is why, in Einstein’s mind, a new understanding
of space and time themselves was in the offing.
Both the mathematical form of the transformations, and at least the non-
classical distortion of moving rigid bodies were already known to Lorentz,
Larmor and Poincare´—indeed a family of possible deformation effects was
originally suggested independently by Lorentz and G. F. FitzGerald to ex-
plain the Michelson-Morley result.16 It was the connection between them,
i.e. between the coordinate transformations and motion-induced deforma-
tion, that had not been fully appreciated before Einstein. In the first (“kine-
matical”) part of his 1905 relativity paper, Einstein established the oper-
ational meaning of the so-called Lorentz coordinate transformations and
showed that they lead not just to a special case of FitzGerald-Lorentz defor-
mation (longitudinal contraction), but also to the “slowing down” of clocks
in motion—the phenomenon of time dilation. Now it is still not well known
that Larmor and Lorentz had come tantalizingly close to predicting this phe-
nomenon; they had independently seen just before the turn of the century
how it must hold in certain very special cases. But as a general effect that
does not depend on the constitution of a clock, its discovery was Einstein’s
own.
Einstein did something else that was new and important in the kine-
matical part of his paper. He derived the Lorentz transformations not from
the symmetry properties of Maxwell’s equations, but by using an argument
inspired by thermodynamics. The reason lies in his earlier investigations of
the properties of black-body radiation.
Several months before he wrote his paper on SR, Einstein had written a
revolutionary paper claiming that electromagnetic radiation has a granular
structure. The suggestion that radiation was made of quanta—or photons
as they would later be dubbed—was the basis of Einstein’s extraordinary
16For recent treatments of this episode, see Brown (2001, 2005b).
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treatment of the photoelectric effect in the same paper. But the immediate
consequence of Einstein’s commitment to the photon was to destabilize in
his mind all the previous work on the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
All the work of the ether theorists was based on the assumption that
Maxwellian electrodynamics is strictly true, and not just true on average.
In the work of Lorentz, Larmor and Poincare´, the Lorentz transformations
make their appearance as symmetry transformations (whether considered
approximate or otherwise) of these equations. But Maxwell’s equations are
incompatible with the existence of the photon.
In his 1949 Autobiographical Notes, published when he was 67, Einstein
was clear about the seismic implications of this conundrum.
Reflections of this type [on the dual wave-particle nature of radi-
ation] made it clear to me as long ago as shortly after 1900, i.e.,
shortly after Planck’s trailblazing work, that neither mechanics
nor electrodynamics could (except in limiting cases) claim exact
validity. By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering
the true laws by means of constructive efforts based on known
facts.17
Already in the Notes, Einstein had pointed out that the general validity of
Newtonian mechanics came to grief with the success of the electrodynamics
of Faraday and Maxwell, which led to Hertz’s detection of electromagnetic
waves—“phenomena which by their very nature are detached from every
ponderable matter”.18 Later, he summarized the nature of Planck’s 1900
derivation of his celebrated black-body radiation formula, in which quanti-
zation of absorption and emission of energy by the mechanical resonators
is presupposed. Einstein noted that although this contradicted the received
view, it was not immediately clear that electrodynamics—as opposed to
mechanics—was violated. But now with the emergence of the light quan-
tum, not even electrodynamics was sacrosanct.
All my attempts . . . to adapt the theoretical foundation of physics
to this [new type of] knowledge failed completely. It was if the
ground had been pulled out from under one, with no firm foun-
dation to be seen anywhere, upon which one could have built.19
Earlier in the Notes, Einstein had sung the praises of classical thermo-
dynamics, “the only physical theory of universal content concerning which
I am convinced that, within the framework of the applicability of its ba-
sic concepts, it will never be overthrown”. Now, he explains how the very
structure of the theory was influential in the search for a way out of the
turn-of-the-century crisis in physics.
17Einstein (1969), p. 51, 53
18Op. cit., p. 25
19Op. cit., p. 45.
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The longer and more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the
conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle
could lead us to assured results. The example I saw before me
was thermodynamics. The general principle was there given in
the theorem20: the laws of nature are such that it is impossible
to construct a perpetuum mobile (of the first and second kind).
How, then, could such a universal principle be found?21
4 Einstein’s doubts
It is well-known that Einstein’s based his derivation of the Lorentz trans-
formations on a combination of the relativity principle (essentially the same
as that defended by Newton) and his so-called light postulate. (The latter
was the claim that relative to a certain inertial frame, the speed of light is
independent of the speed of the source and isotropic—something every ether
theorist took for granted when the frame in question is taken to be the fun-
damental ether rest frame22 and something which remarkably Einstein felt
would survive whatever the eventual quantum theory of radiation would re-
veal.) He showed that length contraction for rigid rods and time dilation
for ideal clocks are consequences of these phenomenological assumptions,
in the same way that, say, the existence of entropy and its non-decreasing
behaviour over time for adiabatic systems are a consequence of the laws of
thermodynamics. Of course, the precise form of the phenomena of contrac-
tion and dilation depended on Einstein’s choice of a convention for spread-
ing time through space in both the resting and moving frames—a choice
Poincare´ had already advocated.
Einstein would have preferred a constructive account of these relativistic
effects, presumably based on the nature of the non-gravitational forces that
hold the constituent parts of rods and clocks together. But as we have seen,
for Einstein the elements of such an account were not to be had in 1905.
The price to be paid for the resulting strategic retreat to a principle theory
approach was not just loss of insight; Einstein became increasingly uneasy
about the role played by rods and clocks in this approach. This unease is
seen in a paper entitled “Geometry and Experience” he published in 192123,
and in particular in his 1949 Autobiographical Notes:
20The word “theorem” for “Satze” in the translation by P. A. Schilpp is perhaps better
rendered as “sentence” or “statement”. One of us (H.R.B.) thanks Thomas Mu¨ller for
discussion of this point.
21Op. cit., p. 53.
22In 1921, Wolfgang Pauli would correctly describe Einstein’s light postulate as the
“true essence of the old aether point of view”; Pauli (1981), p. 5. It should also be noted
that the derivation of the Lorentz transformations requires a third, admittedly innocuous,
assumption: the isotropy of space.
23Einstein (1921).
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One is struck [by the fact] that the theory [of special relativ-
ity] . . . introduces two kinds of physical things, i.e., (1) measur-
ing rods and clocks, (2) all other things, e.g., the electromagnetic
field, the material point, etc. This, in a certain sense, is incon-
sistent; strictly speaking measuring rods and clocks would have
to be represented as solutions of the basic equations (objects
consisting of moving atomic configurations), not, as it were, as
theoretically self-sufficient entities. However, the procedure jus-
tifies itself because it was clear from the very beginning that the
postulates of the theory are not strong enough to deduce from
them sufficiently complete equations . . . in order to base upon
such a foundation a theory of measuring rods and clocks. . . .
But one must not legalize the mentioned sin so far as to imagine
that intervals are physical entities of a special type, intrinsically
different from other variables (‘reducing physics to geometry’,
etc.).24
These remarks are noteworthy for several reasons.
First, there is the issue of justifying the “sin” of treating rods and clocks
as primitive, or unstructured entities in SR. Einstein does not say in 1949,
as he did in 1908 and 1921, that the “elementary” foundations of a con-
structive theory of matter are still unavailable; rather he simply reminds us
of the limits built into the very form of the 1905 theory. It is hardly any
justification at all. Considerable progress in the relativistic quantum theory
of matter had been made between 1905 and 1949. Was it Einstein’s long-
standing distrust of the quantum theory that held him back from recognizing
this progress and its implications for his formulation of SR?
Second, consider the criticism Abraham Pais made of H. A. Lorentz in
his acclaimed 1982 biography of Einstein: “Lorentz never fully made the
transition from the old dynamics to the new kinematics.”25 As late as 1915
Lorentz thought that the relativistic contraction of bodies in motion can be
explained if the known property of distortion of the electrostatic field sur-
rounding a moving charge is supposed to obtain for all the other forces that
are involved in the cohesion of matter. In other words, Lorentz viewed such
kinematical effects as length contraction as having a dynamical origin, and
it is this notion that Pais found reprehensible. Yet, when Einstein appeals
to the nature of rods and clocks as “moving atomic configurations”, it seems
that not even he ever fully accepted the distinction between dynamics and
kinematics. For to say that length contraction is intrinsically kinematical
would be like saying that energy or entropy are intrinsically thermodynam-
ical, not mechanical—something Einstein would never have accepted.26
24Einstein (1969), pp. 59, 61.
25Pais (1982), p. 167.
26Joseph Larmor commented in relation to Einstein’s 1905 relativity paper that it actu-
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The limitations of Einstein’s principle-theory approach to SR have been
noted by a number of commentators since 1905, including Wolfgang Pauli
and Arthur Eddington in the 20s, W. F. G. Swann in the 40s, and Lajos
Ja´nossy and John S. Bell in the 70s, and Dennis Dieks in the 80s27 All of
these authors called for a more constructive version of SR. It was perhaps
Bell who made the point in the clearest fashion.
If you are, for example, quite convinced of the second law
of thermodynamics, of the increase of entropy, there are many
things that you can get directly from the second law which are
very difficult to get directly from a detailed study of the kinetic
theory of gases, but you have no excuse for not looking at the
kinetic theory of gases to see how the increase of entropy actually
comes about. In the same way, although Einstein’s theory of spe-
cial relativity would lead you to expect the FitzGerald contrac-
tion, you are not excused from seeing how the detailed dynamics
of the system also leads to the FitzGerald contraction.28
What is remarkable is that Bell himself seemed to be unaware of Einstein’s
own distinction between principle and constructive theory, and his repeated
references to the analogy between SR and thermodynamics. At any rate,
Bell stressed that he had no “reservation whatever about the power and
precision of Einstein’s approach”; his main point was that “the longer road
[a dynamical account of contraction and dilation] sometimes gives more fa-
miliarity with the country”.29
5 The CBH historical fable
Let us return to the CBH argument. These authors offered a thought-
provoking historical fable wherein SR began with Minkowski, who proposed
a non-Newtonian geometry of space-time, and only later did Einstein come
up with his principle theory approach. CHS regarded Minkowski as pro-
viding an “algorithm for relativistic kinematics”, presumably based on the
group of isometries of the postulated space-time structure, whereas in their
fable they saw Einstein as furnishing an interpretation for SR: “a descrip-
tion of the conditions under which the [Minkowski] theory would be true, in
terms of certain principles that constrain the law-like behaviour of physical
systems”. Analogously, it was argued, the CBH theorem could be viewed
ally contained dynamical reasoning “masquerading in the language of kinematics”; Larmor
(1929), p. 644.
27See Pauli (1981); Eddington (1928), p. 7; Swann (1941); Ja´nossy (1971); Bell
(1976, 1992); and Dieks (1984).
28Bell (1992).
29Bell (1976). For a discussion of Bell’s 1976 treatment of SR by way of a “Lorentzian
pedagogy”, see Brown and Pooley (2001) and Brown (2005b).
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as providing an interpretation of quantum theory, based on information-
theoretic constraints. It is clear from the CBH article that the authors
regarded such an interpretation as having much in common with a position
widely attributed to Niels Bohr, to the effect that quantum mechanics is not
about micro-physical reality per se but rather the way we talk about it.
In attempting to evaluate CBH’s neo-Bohrian stance, it is worth re-
calling first that the dominant viewpoint in the philosophy of space-time
physics over the last few decades puts a very different gloss on Minkowski’s
contribution to SR. Far from being the basis of a mere algorithm for SR,
the current orthodoxy seems to be that Minkowskian geometry provides a
constructive dimension to SR (though it is not always put in these terms),
and thereby significantly enhances its explanatory power. According to this
view, it is the structure of the Minkowski space-time in which they are im-
mersed that ultimately explains why rods and clocks in motion contract
and dilate respectively.30 But it is also worth bearing in mind that this was
not entirely Minkowski’s own interpretation of the four-dimensional geome-
try that bears his name. Minkowski’s original position was much more like
Poincare´’s (who indeed by 1906 had anticipated core features of Minkowski’s
work). It was that the Lorentz coordinate transformations can be seen as
orthogonal transformations preserving the metrical properties of space-time,
but the physical significance of these transformations derives from the fact
that they are elements of the newly-discovered, or rather postulated, co-
variance group of all the non-gravitational interactions. The geometry does
not come first—it is the dynamical symmetries that are fundamental, and
susceptible to geometrical codification.31 In short, on either of these two
views of the significance of Minkowski’s contribution, it amounts to a great
deal more than a mere algorithm.
It is arguable that Minkowski’s own reasoning is not at root incompat-
ible with the currently unorthodox dynamical interpretation of relativistic
kinematics outlined in the previous section. The starting point of this ac-
count is indeed the Lorentz covariance of the equations governing all the
non-gravitational forces—which in turn account for the cohesive properties
of rigid bodies and clocks. We are not dealing here with a fully-fledged
constructive theory, because the full details of the quantum theory of such
interactions (and quantum theory it must be) are not required in the story.
But such a theory would go a long way to avoid Einstein’s self-confessed
“sin” of treating rods and clocks as structureless, primitive entities, and the
treating of space-time intervals as entities of a special type in the explana-
tory scheme of things.
It is not our purpose here to defend this dynamical, semi-constructive
30See Balashov and Janssen (2003) and Brown and Pooley (2006).
31See Brown (2005b), ch 8.
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approach to relativistic kinematics.32 It is rather to point out that Einstein’s
original 1905 formulation of SR has its limitations, as Einstein himself knew
full well and did not seek to hide. It is far from clear that he would have
encouraged the use of SR—his 1905 SR—as a template for an ‘interpreta-
tion’ of quantum theory. Or rather, for a fundamental interpretation. It
is a remarkable thing that what might be called the kinematic structure of
quantum theory, the nature of its observables and state space structure, can
it seems be given a principle-theory, or ‘thermodynamic’ underpinning. As
Bell stressed, the beauty of thermodynamics is in its economy of reason,
but the insight it provides is limited in relation to the messier story told in
statistical mechanics.
In assessing the import of the CBH theorem, Jeffrey Bub wrote:
Assuming the information-theoretic constrainsts are in fact sat-
isfied in our world, no mechanical theory of quantum phenomena
that includes an account of measurement interactions can be ac-
ceptable, and the appropriate aim of physics at the fundamental
level becomes the representation and manipulation of informa-
tion.33
The reasoning behind this remarkable conclusion that no mechanical
account of the measurement process in quantum mechanics is viable, seems
at first sight to be the analogue of the argument in SR that because Einstein
treated rods and clocks as primitive entities in 1905, no analysis of their
behaviour qua moving atomic configurations is appropriate. An argument
flatly rejected by Einstein himself.
However, it should be noted that a key part of Bub’s 2004 argument is
that the historical success of statistical mechanics, and in particular recog-
nition that the molecular-kinetic theory is more than a ‘useful fiction’, came
about because of Einstein’s theory of Brownian motion. This theory not only
allowed molecules to be counted, but demonstrated the limits of validity of
thermodynamics. Where, Bub effectively asks, is the analogue of such supe-
riority of constructive thought—the analogue of fluctuation phenomena—in
quantum mechanics?
The methodological moral I draw from the thermodynamics case
is simply that a mechanical theory that purports to solve the
measurement problem is not acceptable if it can be shown that,
in principle, the theory can have no excess empirical content over
a quantum theory. By the CBH theorem, given the information-
theoretic constraints any extension of a quantum theory, like
32For such a defense, see Brown and Pooley (2001, 2006) and Brown (2005b).
33Bub (2004), p. 242.
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Bohmian mechanics, must be empirically equivalent to a quan-
tum theory, so no such theory can be acceptable as a deeper me-
chanical explanation of why quantum phenomena are such sub-
ject to the information-theoretic constraints. To be acceptable,
a mechanical theory that includes an account of our measuring
instruments as well as the quantum phenomena they reveal (and
so purports to solve the measurement problem) must violate one
or more of the information-theoretic constraints.34
Yet it is very doubtful whether Einstein advocated recognition of boosted
rods and clocks as “moving atomic configurations” in SR because he thought
such a view might ultimately lead to a violation of one or more of this 1905
postulates. It is more plausible that he did so because it made sense concep-
tually.35 Likewise, disillusionment with the crude instrumentalistic nature
of key aspects of Bohr’s philosophy is justifiably one of the motivations
for alternative interpretations of quantum theory—whether they involve an
“extension” to the quantum formalism (such as the de Broglie-Bohm tra-
jectories, or the collapse mechanism of GRW-type theories) or not (such as
the Everett interpretation).36
6 Acknowledgments
We wish to thank Bill Demopoulos for the kind invitation to contribute to
this volume in honour of Jeff Bub, and to applaud him for conceiving and
undertaking this project. We feel privileged. For nearly four decades Jeff
Bub has been a leading figure in the foundations of quantum mechanics,
through work characterized by honesty, rigour and penetration. Long may
it continue.
References
Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen. Critical notice: Presentism and relativ-
ity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54:327–46, 2003.
H Barnum, C M Caves, C A Fuchs, R Jozsa, and B Schumacher. Noncom-
muting mixed states cannot be broadcast. Physical Review Letters, 76:
2318, 1996.
34Bub (2004), p. 261.
35It is however interesting to ask whether there actually is an analogue of Brownian
motion in the dynamical interpretation of SR. A positive answer, which appeals to certain
phenomena in quantum field theory such as the Scharnhorst effect, is defended in Brown
(2005b), ch. 9.
36For further arguments in this vein, in particular defending the de Broglie-Bohm theory
from Bub’s 2004 criticism, see Timpson (2004), pp. 218–222.
13
John S. Bell. How to teach special relativity. Progress in Scientific Culture,
1, 1976. Reprinted in Bell (1987), pp. 67–80.
John S. Bell. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1987.
John S. Bell. George Francis FitzGerald. Physics World, 5:31–35, 1992.
1989 lecture, abridged by Denis Weare.
Harvey R. Brown. The origins of length contraction: I the FitzGerald-
Lorentz deformation hypothesis. American Journal of Physics, 69:1044–
1054, 2001. E-prints: arXiv:gr-qc/0104032; PITT-PHIL-SCI 218.
Harvey R. Brown. Einstein’s misgivings about his 1905 formulation of special
relativity. European Journal of Physics, 26(6):S85–S90, 2005a.
Harvey R. Brown. Physical relativity: space-time structure from a dynamical
perspective. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005b.
Harvey R. Brown and Oliver Pooley. The origins of the spacetime met-
ric: Bell’s Lorentzian pedagogy and its significance in general rela-
tivity. In Callender and Huggett (2001), pp. 256–272, 2001. E-print:
arXiv:gr-qc/9908048.
Harvey R. Brown and Oliver Pooley. Minkowski space-time: a glorious
non-entity. In Dennis Dieks and Miklos Redei, editors, The Ontology
of Spacetime. Elsevier, 2006. An earlier version appeared in arXiv:
physics/0403088 and PITT-PHIL-SCI 1661.
Jeffrey Bub. Why the quantum? Studies in History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics, 35:241–66, 2004.
Craig Callender and Nick Huggett, editors. Physics meets philosophy at the
Planck scale. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
Rob Clifton, Jeffrey Bub, and Hans Halvorson. Characterizing quantum the-
ory in terms of information theoretic constraints. Foundations of Physics,
33(11):1561, 2003. Page references to arXiv:quant-ph/0211089.
Dennis Dieks. The “reality” of the Lorentz contraction. Zeitschrift fu¨r
allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 15:33–45, 1984.
Arthur S. Eddington. The Nature of the Physical World. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 1928.
A. Einstein. Zur elektrodynamik bewegter ko¨rper. Annalen der Physik, 17:
891–921, 1905.
14
A. Einstein. Bemerkung zur Notiz des Herrn P. Ehrenfest: Translation
deformierbarer Elektronen und der Fla¨chensatz. Annalen der Physik, 23:
206–208, 1907. English translation in Einstein (1989), Doc. 44, pp. 236–7.
A. Einstein. What is the theory of relativity? The London Times, 1919.
Reprinted in Einstein (1982) pp. 227–32.
A. Einstein. Geometrie und erfahrung. Erweite Fassung des Festvortrages
gehalten an der presussischen Akademie Springer: Berlin., 1921. Trans-
lated by S. Bargmann as ‘Geometry and Experience’ in Einstein (1982),
pp. 232–246.
A. Einstein. Autobiographical notes. In P. A. Schilpp, editor, Albert Ein-
stein: Philosopher-Scientist, Vol. 1, pages 1–94. Open Court, Illinois,
1969.
A. Einstein. Ideas and Opinions. Crown Publishers, Inc., New York, 1982.
A. Einstein. The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Vol. 2, The Swiss
Years: Writings, 1900–1909 (English Translation Supplement), Princeton
University Press, Princeton. Translated by A. Beck., 1989.
A. Einstein. Letter to Arnold Sommerfeld, January 14, 1908. Document 73
in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Vol. 5, The Swiss Years: Cor-
respondence, 1902–1914 (English Translation Supplement, M. J. Klein, A.
J. Kox and R. Schulmann (eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Translated by A. Beck., 1995.
Peter Galison. Einstein’s Clocks, Poincare´’s Maps. Empires of Time. Hodder
and Stoughton, London, 2004.
Hans Halvorson. On information-theoretic characterizations of physical the-
ories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35(2):277–93,
2004.
L. Ja´nossy. Theory of Relativity based on Physical Reality. Akade´mie Kiado´,
Budapest, 1971.
Joseph Larmor. Mathematical and Physical Papers, Vol. I. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, 1929.
Abraham Pais. ‘Subtle is the Lord. . . ’ The Science and the Life of Albert
Einstein. Oxford University Press, New York, 1982.
Wolfgang Pauli. Theory of Relativity. Dover, New York, 1981. Originally
published as ’Relativita¨tstheorie’, Encyklopa¨die der matematischen Wis-
senschaften, mit Einschluss ihrer Anwendungen vol 5. Physik ed. A. Som-
merfeld (Tauber, Leibzig), 1921; pp. 539–775.
15
W. F. G. Swann. Relativity, the FitzGerald-Lorentz contraction, and quan-
tum theory. Reviews of Modern Physics, 13:197–202, 1941.
Christopher G. Timpson. The applicability of the Shannon information in
quantum mechanics and Zeilinger’s foundational principle. Philosophy of
Science, Supplement: Proceedings of PSA, 70:1233–44, 2002.
Christopher G. Timpson. On a supposed conceptual inadequacy of the Shan-
non information in quantum mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy
of Modern Physics, 33:441–68, 2003.
Christopher G. Timpson. Quantum information theory and the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics. D.Phil. thesis, Oxford University, 2004.
arXiv:quant-ph/0412063.
Antony Valentini. Universal signature of non-quantum systems. arXiv:
quant-ph/0309107, 2003.
16
